A Basic Study on American Legal Realism

Abstract

Naturally, the first thing that comes to mind when discussing This can be a "New Legal Realism" in contrast to the well-known original movement. Can we also mention that, unlike Karl Llewellyn, we have a website?  Our current legal, political, and social climate differs from that of the democratic reformers, the academics who opposed legal formalism, and the few who tried empirical legal study in the late 1920s and early 1930s.  Classical realism is essentially misrepresented by Jonathan Kirshner. He wants to bring classical realism back, yet he never gives us an explanation or talks to other scholars who developed the paradigm. Despite advocating for a more complex form of realism, he spends a significant amount of the book talking about modernism and "hyper reasoning." Although he puts Thucydides front and center, his interpretation of him is shallow and unsupportable in light of modern realism clichés. We can hum "ThingsAin’t What They Used to Be" by Duke Ellington after forty years of the Law and Society Association. We are aware of a great deal that was only anecdotally known throughout the 1920s and 1930s by academics. This essay discusses in detail two key elements of this tradition: realism and historicism. It concludes by making the case that returning to some of these earlier legal writers and texts may be a more underlying way to develop a constructive standpoint in the contexts of international law and human rights, as opposed to relying too heavily on Carl Schmitt's politically provocative (and problematic) rhetorical flourishes.